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ABSTRACT
This article examines the evolution of the State’s role in management of the environment. The French
experience, characterised by a highly-centralised State, presents researchers with a situation where any
permanence, like any change, tends to be extreme. Therefore it acts as a starting point for our analysis of
changes in the State’s role in the management of nature, which was formerly considered as a resource to
be exploited, and is now redefined as an environment to be protected. In particular, diachronic analysis
enables us to grasp the dynamics of these social changes. On the basis of an interdisciplinary exchange
between a historian and a sociologist, this article suggests that we should qualify theories of the
disappearance of the State by giving ourselves the means to differentiate, in management of the
environment, what is new and what is not, by highlighting the capacity for “integration of criticism”
(BOLTANSKI; CHIAPELLO, 1999) by institutions. The environment is an instrument of hybridisation
that questions old dichotomies: between nature and culture, between local and national, between the
particular and the general, between vernacular knowledge and scientific knowledge. This questioning
tends to deprive science and politics of their respective monopolies as representatives of nature and of
society1. Against this background, the central State becomes a manager of socio-natural diversity, the
technocratic State gives a voice to local know-how, and the State concedes a certain plurality to the
general public interest of which it no longer has quite a complete monopoly. The State is no longer quite
what it was, in its role and its functioning, but the State endures. Thus, the society is changing, but the
categories of the XX° century are not totally obsolete yet.
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RESUMO
Este artigo examina a evolução do papel do Estado na gestão do ambiente. A experiência francesa,
caracterizada por um Estado altamente centralizado, propõe aos pesquisadores uma situação onde qual-
quer permanência, assim como qualquer mudança, tende a ser extrema. Assim, ela serve como um ponto
de partida para nossa análise das mudanças no papel do Estado na gestão da natureza, que era anterior-
mente considerada como um recurso a ser explorado, e agora é redefinida como um ambiente a ser
protegido. Em particular, análise diacrônica nos permite apreender a dinâmica dessas mudanças sociais.
Com base numa troca interdisciplinar entre um historiador e uma socióloga, este artigo sugere que
deveríamos qualificar teorias de desaparecimento do Estado nos armando dos meios para diferenciar, na
gestão do ambiente, o que é novo e o que não é, através do destaque da capacidade para a “integração da
crítica” (integration of criticism, BOLTANSKY; CHIAPELLO, 1999) pelas instituições. O ambiente é
um instrumento de hibridização que questiona velhas dicotomias: entre natureza e cultura, entre local e
nacional, entre o particular e o geral, entre conhecimento vernáculo e conhecimento científico. Este
questionamento tende a privar a ciência e a política dos seus respectivos monopólios como representan-
tes da natureza e da sociedade1. Contra este pano de fundo, o Estado central se torna um gestor da
diversidade sócio-natural, o Estado tecnocrático dá uma voz ao saber-fazer local, e o Estado concede
uma certa pluralidade ao interesse público geral, do qual ele já não tem mais um monopólio tão comple-
to. O Estado já não é mais bem o que ele era, no seu papel e no seu funcionamento, mas o Estado
perdura. Assim, a sociedade está mudando, mas as categorias do século XX ainda não estão totalmente
obsoletas.
Palavras-chave: gestão ambiental; Estado francês; sócio-história.
Introduction
The borderless nature of environmental flows requires
to question the boundaries between the natural and the so-
cial, and the forms of categorisation internal to these two
fields. Among the categories questioned, and not the least,
is the Nation-State, which was all to often taken as the
virtually natural scale of analysis by classical social
sciences. The Nation-State, as a category of thought and
action, is a construction, i.e., it is historically situated, and
therefore not universal, unchanging, nor infinite. Sociology
now provides analyses in terms of breakdown of social
cohesion, the weakening of the State2, or even the withering
away of the Nation3. This paradigm of the weakening of
the State is based on the observation of two dynamics that
are apparently opposite: globalisation and/or
regionalisation. Whether it is feared or desired, the end of
the Nation-State is associated with radical modification of
social cohesion, whether it is a move towards an alienating
or enriching world-wide system or, on the other hand, a
revitalising revival of local identity or a bloody separatist
withdrawal. In this context, the State, which represents the
community of citizens (SCHNAPPER, 1994) and is the
guardian of national unity, would lose its reason for
existence if citizenship becomes “post-national” (FERRY,
1991), if borders are broken down by the cyberworld or
redrawn by regionalism, and if unity gives way to diversity
or chaos. The environmental question is fully involved in
this double globalisation/regionalisation process. Frederic
H. Buttel, Arthur P.J. Mol and Gert Spaargaren (2000) note
that the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power station
was one of the most momentous events that revealed the
limitations of the “Nation-State” as a scale for
understanding and managing the physical and social space.
In this respect, one remembers how, for several years, the
French State tried to deny that the radioactive cloud had
passed over the country. Just as radioactive clouds do not
2 In this respect, one may mention the concept of “Europe of the Regions” (LABASSE, 1991).
3 This is how Dominique Schnapper’s book (1994) starts: “the weakening, or withering away of the Nation today, universally observed …”Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 16, p. 39-53, jul./dez. 2007. Editora UFPR 41
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stop at borders, many environmental issues question, or
even challenge, the relevance of the national scale. Thus,
the “environmental flows” (MOL; SPAARGAREN, 2003)
make us revise our mindsets concerning society as much
as “nature”. On the basis of this observation, these analyses
stress the obsolescence of the national scale with respect
to “sub-national” and “supra-national” scales. These
analyses are based on observations that are very often
unquestionable. Nowadays, it is difficult to deny these two
dynamics of globalisation and regionalisation. However,
does this therefore mean that we must analysis this process
in terms of weakening of the State? Are we witnessing a
“withering away” of the State or rather a change in its role
and a transformation of its forms and methods of action?
This article examines the evolution of the State’s role
in management of the environment. The French experience,
characterised by a highly-centralised State, presents
researchers with a situation where any permanence, like
any change, tends to be extreme. Therefore it acts as a
starting point for our analysis of changes in the State’s role
in the management of nature, which was formerly
considered as a resource to be exploited, and is now
redefined as an environment to be protected. In particular,
diachronic analysis enables us to grasp the dynamics of
these social changes. On the basis of an interdisciplinary
exchange between a historian and a sociologist, this article
suggests that we should qualify theories of the
disappearance of the State by giving ourselves the means
to differentiate, in management of the environment, what
is new and what is not, by highlighting the capacity for
“integration of criticism” (BOLTANSKI; CHIAPELLO
1999) by institutions.
I.  The  State  as  manager  of  the  environment:
the  old  and  the  new
In the analysis of social change, one way to avoid
jumping to hasty conclusions about “withering away” is to
compare two perspectives that sociology tends to define
classically as opposed: social reproduction and social
change. Whatever the theoretical and ideological stakes
involved in this opposition, it initially seems to be very
logical: the immobile is opposed to the mobile, permanence
to change. However, reproduction and change are not as
opposed as pure logic would have us believe. Not to be
reducing, one should no longer envisage the transition from
reproduction to change as a sudden, radical turning point.
This is what Alexis de Tocqueville4 suggested, when saying
that revolution makes change visible, or even accelerates
change, more than it creates it. From this analysis, we shall
particularly retain that changes which affect the present time
have their source in the apparent, but only apparent, inertia
of yesterday. This is also the message of what is called the
history of mentalities, that other history advocated and
developed particularly by Georges Duby and Fernand
Braudel5, who, in getting away from the events-based
approach and into the long-term perspective, reveal the
illusory rupture between permanence and change.
Yesterday’s so-called “permanence” contains not only
conditions, but also the components of today’s changes.
Or, in brief, the present was already (at least partly) in the
past and, conversely, the past is still (visible) in the present.
One of the figures of this intertwining between past
and present, between social reproduction and social change,
is the integration of criticism, followed closely by the
disarming of criticism (BOLTANSKI; CHIAPELLO, 1999).
Integration by a former collective, although it leads to
disarming of criticism, cannot be reduced to the schematic
idea of social reproduction. For this integration involves
modifications of the former collective, whether in its
composition and/or its organisation. The integration of
criticism is not a sudden radical change either, since the
former collective continues to exist, at least partially.
During the 19th century, the State affirmed itself as
the architect of projects for planning and developing rural
and urban areas. In this respect, may we speak of
management of the environment? According to the meaning
4 The French Revolution was a “violent, rapid process in which the political State was adapted to the social State, facts to ideas, and laws to customs” (TOCQUEVILLE;
1986).
5 One may particularly mention “La Méditerranée” (BRAUDEL; DUBY, 1985) and “La dynamique du capitalisme” (BRAUDEL, 1985), in which the author thus
explains his approach: “What I see as primordial in the pre-industrial economy, in fact, is the coexistence of forms of rigidity, inertia and sluggishness of a still
elementary economy, together with movements that were limited and in the minority, but vibrant and powerful, of modern growth. […] So there were at least two
worlds, two foreign types of life, according to which, however, the respective masses explain each other”.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 16, p. 39-53, jul./dez. 2007. Editora UFPR 42
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now given to this expression, it was not a real environmental
policy designed to protect nature and limit the harmful
effects of anthropogenic changes of the physical
environment. In the 19th century, and during a large part of
the 20th century, the term “environment” did not exist, or
did not have the same meaning (its current meaning only
appeared in the United States during the 1960s, and in
France in the very early 1970s). The State is concerned with
protecting nature as a resource and to protect people against
natural and industrial uncertainties. These declared aims
of State policies do not mention the protection of nature
itself. The developer’s aim is to place nature at the disposal
of humankind and to control its excesses.
As affirmed by Carrion Nizas, orator of the Tribunat
on 16 September 1807 concerning the act of parliament on
the draining of marshes:
The physical sciences, which are more audacious and
more powerful every day, will provide their efficient
assistance... Nothing will stop the advance of a
government that is accustomed to working wonders, and
which is jealously intent on putting the mark of Man’s
work on all material objects, to show the power of Man’s
genius and moral strength [...] 6"
Technical services put in place by the State developed
expertise in the development and management of nature.
Two major institutions of the French State formed the se-
cular arm of the public authorities. The Corps des Ponts et
Chaussées [the “Bridges and Roads Corps”], founded in
1740 and reinforced during the French Revolution had the
tasks of carrying out all major planning and development
projects, roads, railway lines, canals, drainage of wet areas
(after the 1807 Act), river embankments, irrigation canals
and water supply to towns. The Corps des Eaux et Forests
[“Waters and Forests Corps”], founded in 1801, had the
tasks of enforcing laws for the protection of forests,
particularly concerning the timber industry and
reforestation. It conducted a very ambitious programme of
reforestation of upland areas on the basis of the 1860 act of
parliament.
I.1. Towards a new paradigm: nature subjected to
scientific rationality
However, while the State’s policy was oriented
towards the development of nature for the benefit of
humankind, laws motivated engineers and political and
economic players to ask themselves new questions on man’s
relationship with nature. Scientific and technical knowledge
developed in order to carry out government programmes
within a perspective of economic and social modernisation.
But this planning and development policy gradually led to
new considerations that sometimes prefigure current ideas.
Local players who felt dispossessed of their traditional
prerogatives often oppose the State’s projects with varying
degrees of success. But they also asked for development
projects to meet the requirements of competition and the
increase in productivity. In rural areas, for example, local
players asked drainage and irrigation and constructions to
protect against rivers.
Following the major floods of 1856 in the Rhone and
Loire valleys, the State intervened in the form of a
programme for the protection of populated areas and in-
dustrial areas. Napoleon III explained clearly that this
protection was one of the State’s duties (to guarantee the
right to safety) and that science and the engineers modern
technology would master the river floods. The engineers,
apparently for the first time, calculated the river’s maximum
theoretical flood level and completed works that protected
the Camargue until 1993, transforming the Rhone delta’s
natural characteristics. Nevertheless, the Camargue, made
of a complex system of embankments, artificial irrigation
and drainage is nowadays an international symbol of wild
life (PICON, 1978).
Another example of State intervention and the
reactions that it causes is that of forests. In France, kings
had protected forests since the 13th century to preserve
mature standing timber in order to build the ships of the
royal navy and traders. Nevertheless, the destruction of
private forests continued, and the French Revolution’s free
market approach threatened the forest with disappearance.
In the 19th century, the State again took charge of the
6 Le Moniteur Universel, 18 September, 1807.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 16, p. 39-53, jul./dez. 2007. Editora UFPR 43
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protection of forests, with which it entrusted the Eaux et
Forests Corps. Two major acts of parliament, in 1827 and
1860, organised the protection of existing forests and the
country’s reforestation, particularly in upland areas, which
had the effect of accelerating the rural exodus by depriving
small farmers of many pastures. The aim of the reforestation
of upland areas was to protect lowland areas threatened by
the change of regime of mountain rivers that are no longer
regulated by a forest cover. This was how the State
developed the national territory according to an overall
vision of the water system that it was given by the
specialised services of the Ponts et Chaussées and Eaux et
Forests corps, on the basis of work by the engineer Surell,
who, in an 1841 publication, showed that deforestation was
responsible for floods7. This work, ratified by the Council
of Engineers of Ponts et Chaussées, was not discussed or
questioned -before the early 20th century.
The social consequences of this legislation on
reforestation are considerable, and they caused population
displacements which, in addition, the State considered as
predators who were responsible, because of their so called
“archaic methods”, for the floods that grew in number in
France in the 1840s. One may also add that, again on the
basis of the reports by expert engineers, whole regions were
entirely transformed. This was the case in the Landes, a
marshland area which, at Napoleon III’s will, was
transformed into one of Europe’s largest forests.
The two above examples of the State management of
nature (Camargue and Landes) show very clearly how the
State contributed to create and manage natural resources,
nowadays considered as “wildlife”, and then protected as
then.
This massive State intervention was backed up by
scientific work that globalised environmental problems and
no longer viewed them from a simple local, partial
viewpoint, but interpreted them on a much broader scale.
This was how the concept of the catchment area started to
be developed for rivers when it was planned to build
“insubmersible” embankments after 1856. In all of this,
there is hardly any nature protection policy that was not
devised for agricultural or industrial end purposes.
Despite everything, forms of resistance arose. In
reaction to the legislator’s plans for reforestation, societies
of friends of the forest were set up to defend another
conception of nature. In 1909, the association “Silva
Mediterranea” was founded, grouping together foresters
who worked in Mediterranean areas, with the aim of
adapting forest developments to local conditions and to
escape from solely economic requirements. Their declared
aim was to preserve existing forests and to create others.
Their approach was based on science, but also conveyed
the idea of the decadence of modern civilisation. This was
not ecologist awareness in the modern sense of the term –
no more than State intervention could be considered an
environmental policy, as we saw above – but it was the
beginnings of a new awareness, partially freed from
productivist aspects. This was the case of the French
geographer of the late 19th century, Elysée Reclus who
denounced man’s intervention that disturbs natural cycles,
and took the Camargue as an example of what should not
be done. Locally, some landowners who adapted the
vulnerability of their lands to the river floods denounced
this plan to completely embank the Rhone, because it risked
preventing the river from bringing its fertile silt to the del-
ta.
Other schools of thought started to mythify the
foundational nature of the “true values” that only farmers
who respect ancestral traditions could understand and
protect. In Provence, Frédéric Mistral, the Marquis de
Baroncelli and Charles Maurras were the representatives
of this conservative ideology8. All three reacted against a
modernisation that they considered excessive and depraved,
leading to the loss of the Provençal language, the neglect
of traditions, and the transformation of social relations. They
advocated the return to values of yesteryear, respecting a
mythified nature that bore the essential values of humanity.
Some years later, Jean Giono exalted this communion of
man with nature, in a sort of rural pantheism.
I.2. The management of nature: a power issue
One must stress a little-known political aspect of the
policy of major planning and development projects in the
19th century in France. The State took advantage of these
projects to impose itself to the detriment of local powers,
7 SURELL, 1841, Études sur les torrents des Hautes Alpes.
8 PICON, Bernard. L’espace et le temps en Camargue. Actes Sud. 1978.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 16, p. 39-53, jul./dez. 2007. Editora UFPR 44
CLAEYS-MEKDADE, C.; ALLARD, P. Managing the environment...
mainly that of eminent local personalities who were
educated and rich, and had public power (TUDESQ, 1964).
This social group, which was strongly in-bred, exercised it
political power over local societies through town halls and
electoral mandates. Its economic power was exercised in
the learned professions, trade, and ownership of large rural
lands. Holding all local powers, they decided, among other
things, the suitability of rural physical planning
developments, and, through a collective network, they
controlled drainage, irrigation and flood protection,
wherever it was found necessary. As in most old or recent
countries, the central State tried throughout the last century
to reinforce its prerogatives.
Development and management of the national
territory for the overall modernisation of society was part
of State strategies. The State considered these eminent ru-
ral personalities to be backward-looking conservatives
opposed to progress. Weakening their power and replacing
them by State services was a constant strategy in the 19th
century. The State reduced the eminent local personalities’
power firstly on a political level, then on the social level.
For their powers, it substituted the role of the State and its
experts. It created the reign of what was to be called in the
20th century the elites who had power because of their
education and the place they held in the State apparatus.
Fatalism, the woe of the time, nature’s resistance to man’s
exploitation faded away in the face of the State’s will to
control. The other side of this imposition of public force
on nature was that responsibility was transferred to the State.
Nature ceased to be all-powerful, and became a controlled
nature – in appearance - that only an error of the State could
free from human domination. Napoleon III proudly declared
in 1857 that “It is to the State’s credit that rivers remain in
their beds” – to which people still react nowadays by
blaming the State when a river bursts its banks.
This strategy of increasing State power was analysed
by Michel Foucault (1961), who shows that this tendency
is part and parcel of the desire to normalise behaviour and
establish an order based on rationality and continually
controlled by the State. Local authorities and, more so,
private individuals were dispossessed of their traditional
know-how and their capacity to act, which were not catered
for in this State framework. Legislation was developed in
the late 19th century, concerning health, the planning and
development of natural areas, forests, coastlines, etc. This
aim of control, which affected all aspects of the lives of
individuals, could only intervene in the tense relationship
between man and nature. But the State also had a certain
conception of modernity and, in the area of major
development projects, priority was given to the development
of modern industries, and the State took charge of providing
the structures necessary for industrial capitalism. This was
how an area designated for fishing and leisure such as the
Etang de Berre lagoon near Marseille was designated for
oil refining in the 1930s. To allow ships to unload their oil
cargo, the public powers deepened the canal linking the
lagoon to the Mediterranean Sea and greatly altered the
lagoon’s ecosystem. In the Alps, several dams were built
for electricity production until the 1960s, creating indus-
trial valleys and the development of transport systems, again
to the detriment of the alpine flora and fauna.
Thus, in the 19th century, the State reinforced its
power by giving itself the monopoly of the defence of the
general public interest and by reducing and delegitimising
the powers of individuals and local communities. In so
doing, it imposed the monopoly of its expertise by using
science to legitimise its action, through the intermediary of
the major State engineering institutions. To use Hervieu
and Léger’s expression (1979), “behind the forest, the
State”.
I.3. From the inherited system to the beginnings of
its questioning
Therefore, the State initiated planning and
developments that now form a real inherited system. In
France, also, people have acquired the habit of looking to
the State every time there is a problem of green or grey
environment. This is particularly sensitive in the risk area,
where, since the 19th century, the State has claimed a
monopoly of expertise and imposed preventive measures
according to the standards that it itself has established. This
results in it being challenged every time a catastrophe
occurs. The State claims to ensure its citizens’ safety;
accordingly, the citizens consider the State as responsible.
Thus, during floods of the River Somme in 2001, the rumour
went round that the State had dumped surplus water through
the canals of the area into the Somme in order to protect
Paris and its catchment area. This unfounded rumour
resulted in the prime minister Lionel Jospin being taken to
task when he went to visit the flooded area on 9 April 2001.
The State expert and developer continued to carry
out large projects until the 1960s, and the opening of theDesenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 16, p. 39-53, jul./dez. 2007. Editora UFPR 45
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Serre-Ponçon dam on the River Durance (in the Alpes)
marks the culmination of this policy. The State, the de fac-
to manager of the national territory, modelled it according
to its own criteria determined by its own experts. The idea
of protecting nature that developed in the first half of the
20th century was taken up for its own ends by the State.
This was translated notably by a subdivision of the national
territory according to specifications determined by the State
services. Certain parts of the territory were designated for
nature conservation and others to industry or tourism. This
characteristic zoning had a legal framework in the creation
of nature reserves. Thus, in the Alps, it is not rare to find
preserved villages which have kept their former appearance
and, just a few kilometres away, some of Europe’s largest
skiing resorts.
The Camargue, mentioned above, has become a
nature reserve, despite anthropogenic changes in the area
through water management for economic ends (PICON,
1978). The preservation of its specific ecosystem requires
the presence of several organisms, and a nature reserve was
created in 1927, and a regional nature park in the 1960s.
Numerous researchers continually monitor changes of a
habitat in which there are activities as diverse as the salt
mining industry, speculative agriculture (mainly rice
growing), very lucrative hunting, and relatively large-scale
summer tourism. A short distance away, the Etang de Berre
has been designated since the early 20th century for indus-
trial activity that resulted in the establishment of a
petrochemical complex in the 1930s, the construction of
tens of Seveso class sites, and the arrival of a canal built by
EDF [the French national electricity supply authority] to
supply electricity power stations. In addition to these
industries a growth in urbanisation has transformed the
Etang’s shores. This industrial area is the antithesis of the
Camargue. the Etang de Berre and the Camargue are both
the product of the specialised use of areas according to the
development criteria defined by the State’s experts.
One of the spin-offs of this State intervention in
physical planning through experts is that a system was put
in place for understanding reality on the basis of scientific
knowledge developed by and for experts. The scientific
approach provided justification for the State’s major
projects and gave them a legitimacy that had its sources in
classical academic science (BECK, 1992). This scientific
justification enabled the technician State to impose a sort
of apparent neutrality that placed its action within the sphere
of the development of nature, beyond the political divides
that mainly concern social policy and foreign policy. These
scientific and technical references placed the State’s
planning and development policy within the idea of progress
shared by most French people of all political persuasions.
The republican school, founded in 1881, was one of the
great vehicles for conveying this approach and making it
accepted, while delegitimising all other approaches. At the
time, the French Left and extreme Left supported the idea
of humanity’s continual progress through the development
of scientific rationality. Thus, the major State engineering
institutions were exempt from all partisan political reproach,
to such a point that many people of the Left imagined that
the work of these major State institutions was deliberately
restricted by the French Right when it was in power, because
the Right was considered a conservative force opposed to
progress. Against the supposed conservatism of right wing
parties, the major servants of the State were considered to
be driving forces of a new, politically neutral world in the
service of the great ideals of progress. This was how there
were so few protests against the construction of large dams
until the 1960s, the submersion of inhabited valleys and
displacement of village populations, and also few protests
against the chosen forms of energy production. Let us look
again at the two local examples already mentioned: the
Camargue and the Etang de Berre. In 1895, a commentator
revelled at the sight of a stream of black smoke over the
Camargue because it was a sign of progress and of human
activity. In the case of the Etang de Berre, there was no, or
at least few, protest against the establishment of the
petrochemicals complex from the 1930s to the 1960s. In a
system of shared values, opposition became difficult, except
to defend a backward-looking position against the idea of
progress, as was the case with Provençal cultural
associations to protect the Camargue.
This State involvement in physical planning justified
by a scientific paradigm certainly made the French State
receptive to the environmental discourse that appeared in
the late 1960s, to the point where a Ministry for the
Protection of Nature and the Environment was set up in
1971. In this case, the State, which is usually caught
unprepared, created a Ministry at the very time when the
issue was emerging. The State developer was naturally the
State “protector” of nature, without fully realising the
underlying challenge of the foundational scientific
paradigm by the ecologist movement. Initially, the State
considered that it also had to have the monopoly of
environmental management, thereby underestimated the
new social partners who intervened in the form of citizens’
associations which denounced the new dangers that theDesenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 16, p. 39-53, jul./dez. 2007. Editora UFPR 46
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State always underestimated, since it was too closely
attached to the requirements of production (Beck, 1992).
One may therefore consider that the creation of a Ministry
of the Environment did not change the State’s behaviour,
and, at the same time, it continued to be primarily concerned
with productivism. However, since around thirty years ago,
change seems to have caught up with the State.
The current questioning of this pattern of State
intervention through its experts and an ideology of
preservation of resources and protection of human activities
results from observation of the globalisation of
environmental problems through international catastrophes,
which were sudden, as in the case of Chernobyl, or more
insidious, as in the case of acid rain in industrialised
countries. In addition, scientific theories have evolved, and
they take into account the interdependence between
phenomena, whether in nature sciences (e.g., atmospheric
circulation that disseminates pollution, as in the case of
Chernobyl or acid rains, or the spreading of plants and
animals via transport systems) or theoretical sciences, such
as mathematics, with Chaos Theory and the theory of
catastrophes developed by René Thom, which shows how
much a slight initial disruption can have consequences of
on an incomparably large scale. These recent discoveries
in the last third of the 20th century had the same effect as
the 19th century engineers’ theories which showed the
interdependence of phenomena by changing explanations
from the regional scale to the national scale for which the
Nation-State framework is no longer appropriate. Today,
this globalisation goes beyond the national framework and
obliges States to envisage other forms of action.
However, in a diachronic perspective that takes the
past into account, we cannot ignore the weight of former
management institutions, which are still in place, and the
State’s power strategies, which must be studied as such,
independently of the declared ideological contents. To pre-
serve its prerogatives, the State can change the objectives
of these policies and adapt itself, but also maintain its power
of control. This perspective is quite characteristic of certain
French schools of thought following the work of Michel
Foucault (1961), who studied the many forms of power
and knowledge, since France is face with a centralisation
that makes the State a very meaningful problem. For
Foucault, the State, by nature, exercises a power of control
that it tries to extend by all means. Wherever it is applied,
power is somehow independent of the end goals of action,
even if this action may be related to political and social
contexts. Seen from this angle, the change of paradigm in
relation to environmental problems may modify the forms
of State intervention and the end goals of its action, but, in
this case, the State tries to exercise power differently. In
other forms, and with original particularities, one may
suppose that, anywhere where there is a State, it exercises
a power that it tries to maintain or increase. According to
Lampedusa, the Sicilian prince Salina, who accepted Italian
unity and the Garibaldian revolution to the surprise of his
entourage, was supposed to have said: “One must accept
the fact that everything changes, so that nothing will
change” (LAMPEDUSA, The Leopard, 1958). In our
opinion, this hypothesis deserves to be taken seriously.
II. Changing is not disappearing: towards
recomposition of the relationship between the
scientist, the politician and the citizen
Environmental sociology has contributed greatly to
the analysis of social changes. The emergence and
development of environmental questions are not just results
of these changes, but are driving forces of them. The
changing role of the State caused by environmental
questions is one of the major changes that provokes thought
on the theories of the State and of social change. However,
the analysis of these changes must not be restricted to the
State itself. To grasp the scope of this change, one must
widen the analysis to its underlying socio-political
foundations: the general public interest and citizenship. The
Nation-State founds its legitimacy on the basis of a certain
definition of the general public interest and citizenship.
When the definition of these two foundations changes, the
State is inevitably affected.
II.1. Diversification of the general public interest
As pointed out in our historical perspective, the State’s
legitimacy is traditionally based on the monopoly of the
general public interest. Just as the principle of
representatives draws and legitimises the barrier between
those who have power of voice and the others, so established
Science and technical rationality draw and legitimise the
barrier between those who have knowledge and the others.
And, when the boundaries of power coincide with those of
Knowledge, then we have the combined ingredients of a
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major French State engineering institutions. In the name of
the general public interest, the State started major national
modernisation projects in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly
with policies for developing the roads and motorways
system and for energy production (hydroelectric dams, nu-
clear power plants). State technocratic rationality also got
involved in the protection of nature, which then took the
form of zoning (e.g., the Mediterranean coastline was
divided into three zones, the Etang de Berre was designated
for industrial development, the Languedoc-Roussillon area
for mass tourism, and the Camargue for nature conservation
(PICON, 1978). Local communities had to accept these
State decisions conceived on scientific and technical bases
advocated by the major State institutions.
From the 1970s, there was growing opposition to
State projects. This resistance to the State developer by users
and by local communities was mainly through community
associations (BLATRIX, 2000). The above examples of the
Camargue and the Etang de Berre again provide a good
illustration. The zoning decreed by the State (all-out
protection in the Camargue versus production on the rim
of the Etang de Berre) was initially accepted almost
passively by the local populations. However, community
groups and associations now voice opposition to these po-
licies by advocating a mixed use of areas, with, in brief, an
aim to take into account human activities in the Camargue,
and a call for redesignation of the Etang de Berre as an
area of nature conservation and leisure.
This rising force of community association
assertiveness was particularly expressed in concrete terms
by the increasing number of their legal actions. On the
national level, in the field of town planning alone, legal
actions increased from 2,600 in 1978 to 6,300 in 1986, and
reached over 10,000 in the 1990s (SEGAUD, 1998). This
increasing number of procedural actions was certainly one
of the factors that explain the development of participative
processes since the 1970s in the context of urban policies
and which were given new life during the 1990s in the
context of environmental policies (BLATRIX, 2000). The
development of these participation policies is part of what
Pieter Leroy (2002) calls “political modernisation”.
The development of these participation policies may
be analysed as a response to what certain authors have
described as “a deep crisis of the French public policies
model” (MULLER, 1992). The model of a central state,
the only guardian of the general public interest and therefore
solely qualified to decide in the name of all the citizens
that it represents, appears to have lost its legitimacy.
Therefore putting in place participative processes would
be a means of avoiding conflicts that the public power is
no longer certain of winning. Everything happens as if the
reasons of State and the modernisation of the Nation are
now no longer sufficient arguments for having public poli-
cies accepted. This change can be understood through
several concomitant phenomena:
• The gradual spread of the environmental question
since the 1970s has contributed to weakening of
the ideology of progress and modernisation
incarnated by the State, by providing arguments
for its criticism, and by extending to the world
outside work and to non-human beings the
connection between social criticism and artistic
criticism that emerged from movements in May
19689.
• The environmental issue particularly addressed by
community movements contributed to stimulating
and transforming these movements, giving them
a new lease of life at a time when the weakening
of their loose ideological-political
conglomerations seemed to herald “the end of
militants”. As Jacques Ion (1997) suggested, it is
more correct to speak of new forms of association
and new militants. The weakening of loose
ideological-political conglomerations means that
community movement demands are no longer
necessarily a political translation of (in simplified
terms) the Left/Right opposition, which tends to
oblige the decision-maker to dialogue directly
with the community associations, since it cannot
negotiate with their Paris-based “politician”
spokespersons.
9 Luc Boltanski & Eve Chiapello (1999) define artistic criticism as a denunciation of capitalism as a “source of disenchantment and inauthenticity” and a “source
of oppression”, and social criticism as a denunciation of capitalism as a “source of misery” and a “source of opportunism and egotism”. Firstly conveyed by different
social groups, the first by intellectuals and artists, the second by movements of workers and trade unions, these two criticisms converged in the demands of May 1968
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• The weakening of loose ideological-political
conglomerations also creates conditions for
specialisation of the militant, no longer according
to a vertical approach (e.g., campaigning for
workers’ rights, the bowls club, or pensions
schemes), but a horizontal approach (e.g.,
campaigning against the development of natural
areas, whether against a T.G.V. high-speed railway
line, a motorway, a high voltage electricity line,
or the disposal of nuclear wastes in landfill sites).
This enables these new militants to acquire
specialised expertise (CLAEYS-MEKDADE;
JACQUÉ, 2007). The “pros” of mobilisation
against State development projects are found
firstly on a local scale, then on a national level,
such as the spokespersons of F.N.E. (France
Nature Environment), and on the international
level (such as WWF or Green Peace).
Against this background, “the Hegelian State
governing over particular interests and deciding in the name
of the general public interest” (MERRIEN, 1993), which
had previously been the pillar of representative
parliamentary democracy, now looked for renewed
legitimacy in the principles of participative democracy. By
giving citizens a voice, not only in elections, but also in the
implementation of environmental policies on the ground,
the State more or less recognises that the definition of the
general public interest is itself debatable. In other words,
the initiation of participative processes by the State breaks
with the former State monopoly and allows diversification
of the general public interest, which is then negotiable.
The opposition to State monopoly, particularly on
environmental questions, implies possible (re-)definition
of the general public interest by other social players.
Community group action is a powerful force for this
diversification of the general public interest. In order to
achieve this, the militant has had to redefine his/her status,
becoming an aware local citizen.
II.2. Emergence of the aware local citizen10
If they are too locally-oriented, militants are accused
of having the narrow-minded NIMBY (Not In My Back
Yard) attitude. If they are too globally-oriented, they lose
their local territorial anchorage. This constraint on militants
is the necessity to meet two contradictory requirements: to
prove their local everyday knowledge, and to prove their
“citizenship”. This makes militants divided between the
necessity to go beyond the singularity of their demands and
the need to prove their “capacity to live” (LAFAYE, 2000).
However, it is not impossible to resolve this dilemma of
the militant. A possible compromise that escapes from the
tension between the general and the particular, between the
citizen and the local inhabitant, took shape in the context
of environmental campaigns. The construction of this
compromise produced the figure of the local citizen
(CLAEYS-MEKDADE, 2000, 2003).
The figure of the local citizen is made possible by
dissociating two dichotomies that were previously
concomitant: the local/national dichotomy and the particu-
lar/general dichotomy. The correspondence between the
local and the particular on one hand, and the national and
general on the other hand, is not universal. It is a central
characteristic of the French tradition, based on the principle
of the Nation State. However, the figure of the local citizen
breaks with this perspective by making the local/general
correspondence  acceptable. The construction of
concordance between the local and the general enables
militants to move towards the more general without losing
their local connection, and conversely, to maintain their
local connections while moving towards the more general.
From this viewpoint, a locality may be defended in the name
of the general public interest. And this is a radical
breakaway.
The principle of local citizenship does not question
the national dimension of the notion of citizenship and, by
extension, its inclusion in the Nation-State, since it involves
a French citizen who lives in a given locality. This citizen
10 The notion of “local citizen” was first proposed by Neveu (1999) and Claeys-Mekdade (2000, 2003). We propose here to precise it by adding  “aware”.Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 16, p. 39-53, jul./dez. 2007. Editora UFPR 49
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may make specific claims and demands, but without
undermining the Nation-State. That is, uniformisation is
opposed, but not unity. In this case, it is a growing awareness
of localness or locality, while still supporting the existing
national unity. Local citizens are not separatists, i.e., they
do not challenge the principle of the Nation as it has been
constructed in Western society, i.e., as “the effort of tearing
away from identities and the bonds of belonging,
experienced as natural by the abstract concept of
citizenship” (SCHNAPPER, 1994).
Therefore local citizens are those who know how to
turn the defence of the locality into a general interest. They
do not defend the locality only for itself, but because it
contributes to rich socio-natural diversity. The local citizen
is also an aware citizen (ESTADET; RÉMY, 2003). Just as
they know how to widen issues to the general scale without
losing touch with the locality, local citizens have local
knowledge, while knowing how to make use of, or at least
refer to, scientific knowledge. The citizens’ increased access
to scientific controversies has been facilitated by the French
provision of mass education resulting from a policy for
democratising access to schooling11. But, particularly in the
field of the environment, it is also the increasing complexity
of questions asked of science that has contributed to making
its internal controversies visible (LATOUR, 1999).
The implication of the aware citizen into scientific
controversies takes mainly two forms. The first one is what
we proposed to call the “Science by proxy” (CLAEYS-
MEKDADE, 2000, 2003), that is to say, when the citizen
asks for counter-expertises. The second one, is what
Elisabeth Rémy (1995) proposes to call “Win over the
science”, that is to says when the citizen tries (and succeeds)
to use science and technology by him/herself. We must pre-
cise the aware citizen is not necessary a scientist, but he/
she is often well qualified, as most of associative militants
(HÉRAN, 1988) and particularly green militants (PICON,
1978, CHAMBOREDON, 1985, ASPE, 1991).
Therefore these aware local citizens contribute to
permeabilising the barriers of the power of voice and of
Knowledge. Furthermore, there may no longer be just one
single power of voice nor one single body of scientific
Knowledge: they may take on many diverse or opposing
forms, representing different viewpoints. Against this
background, the technocratic central State seems to be
losing some of its monopolies, but does this necessarily
mean that it is in the process of disappearing and being
visibly weakened?
II.3. The State redefined as a manager of socio-
natural diversity
The State has not been deprived of its mandate as
voice of the community of citizens, but the nature of its
mandate is changing. For the diversification and the possible
negotiation of the general public interest does not reduce
the State to the rank of just an arbitrator or a moderator12,
but participates more widely in a redefinition of political
cohesion by recomposition of the relationship between the
local and the national. The re-emergence of the local, carried
strongly by environmental campaigns, was initially partly
accepted passively by the central State. However,
paradoxically, it did not weaken the State, but led to its
redefinition, according to a rationale of “integration of
criticism” (BOLTANSKI; CHIAPPELLA, 1999). This
integration of criticism was mainly in the form of new public
consultation policies.
The generation of consultative procedures in the
1970s and 1980s (in the context of urban development)
was part of a decentralisation policy, by directly giving
municipal authorities the responsibility for organising
deliberative procedures. In contrast, the second generation
of consultative procedures developed within the framework
of environmental policies are rather part of a
deconcentration movement, since the initiative and
organisation of such procedures are the responsibility of
the State and/or its deconcentrated services. Paradoxically,
this relative revision of the principle of decentralisation in
favour of deconcentration would result in a desire to have
local concerns increasingly taken into account. State
consultative procedures would be occasions for discussions
and negotiation between “citizens” and representatives of
the State and its deconcentrated services. And, when the
State initiatives a procedure for directly consulting the lo-
11 For an analysis of the mass provision and democratisation of education in France, see particularly Duru-Bellat and Kieffer (2000).
12 The notion of the State as moderator is from Jacques Donzelot and Philippe Estèbe (1994).Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente, n. 16, p. 39-53, jul./dez. 2007. Editora UFPR 50
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cal population, it can go as far as disregarding the
representation power of the local elected representative,
giving their voice the same rank as that of the average citizen
(BALLAN; CLAEYS; LEBORGNE, 2002).
In this context, the State, which had previously been
the guardian of national unity, would not necessarily be
weakened, but would play a different role. This “new” State
would still be a guardian of the nation, but no longer as a
single unit, but in all its diversity. Indeed, the creation of
local districts known as “Pays” and also the public
consultation policies are in line with this approach. The
public consultative procedure, as a direct dialogue between
the State and local communities, would be both a
recognition of national diversity and an affirmation of the
State’s management of this diversity. In the name of the
environment, the State organises and provides a framework
for local dynamics, particularly through legislation. The Act
of parliament concerning Public Debate (the Barnier Act,
dated 2 February 1995) and Acts concerning the creation
of the “Pays” districts (LOADT, 1995; LOADDT, 199913)
are revealing in this respect.
The Barnier Act, particularly concerning major
development plans, recommends the organisation of public
debates14. This means that a development plan – which was
formerly conceived on a national scale and justified by a
general public interest defined by the central power alone
– is now no longer (at least in the statute books) opposed to
local interests that are reduced to the rank of private
interests. The consultation recommended by the Barnier
Act requires the wide range of the local community’s diverse
aspirations to be taken into account. The Public Debate led
by State representatives is followed and evaluated by the
Commission Nationale du Débat Publique [National Public
Debate Commission] which, as its name indicates, is a
national body.
The regional planning and development legislation
encourages the creation of local districts known as “Pays”.
These “Pays”, defined by local players, must constitute
consistent geographic, economic and cultural units. The
uniqueness of these “Pays” is that they may escape from
the former administrative breakdown of France, which is
strongly marked by the centralising tradition of the French
Nation State. The central State plays an original role in this
process: in a way, it goes as far as inviting diversity. On
this subject, in his report for DATAR, “Aménager la France
de 2020” [Developing the France of 2020], Jean-Louis
Guigou (2000) writes that “The strength of French unity
can now work with the diversities of which it is composed”.
The turn of phrase is revealing. After building unity, the
French State could “now” manage diversity, which is raised
to the rank of general public interest and described as a
factor of equity. However, this recomposition of the
relationship between the local and the national does not
seem to supplant the Central State, which is still, in the
final analysis, the guarantor of equity.
Therefore, in the context of environmental policies,
the French State now tends to redefine itself as a manager
of diversity: biological diversity, diversity of landscape, but
also cultural diversity. The State, which was formerly the
defender of national unity, is now the manager of national
diversity, composed of many different localities, but also a
component of world diversity.
Conclusion
To resume, one can notice first that the French State
is characterised by a strong heritage. This heritage includes
(a) a legitimacy based on the monopoly of the general
interest and of the expertise, (b) an early management of
the nature by the State: in a context of rationalisation and
power affirmation, (c) a protection of the nature not for
itself but as a resource. During the earlier 1970’s, the State
stars to protect the environment “for itself”. However it
tempts to do so without changing its habits. This
“traditional” approach of the “environmental State”15 is then
contested. A growing opposition to State projects is
observed which leads it to develop participative processes.
The analyse of the growing opposition to State and the
development of participative processes goes with the
emergence of the “aware local citizen”. Therefore, the State
would lose its monopoly of the general public interest and
13 LOADT: Outline Act for regional planning and development. LOADDT: Outline Act for regional planning and sustainable development.
14 See a presentation and detailed analysis of the Barnier Act in “Le débat public : une réforme dans l’État” (VALLEMONT, 2001).
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of the expertise. Then, the State would be redefined as a
manager of socio-natural diversity. On this point of view,
the French State is changing but not disappearing, neither
weakening.
To conclude, the analysis of the French experience
proposed in this article contributes to reinforcing the thesis
of the environment as a factor of social change. The
environment produces social change by upsetting traditional
social categories. The international nature of environmental
questions is one of the most spectacular features of the
changes that they bring about. Former borders, built on
geopolitical and cultural considerations, are permeable to
environmental flows. However, it is not only its
international character that makes the environment now a
force for social change.
Therefore the environmental issue also affects Nation-
States on the inside. Even when the environmental subjects
in question do not cross borders, they raise the question of
the role of the State. Such an observation contributes to
reinforcing the thesis of the environment as a factor of so-
cial change but, paradoxically, also partly qualifies it.
Sociology has often concluded this regarding the transition
from an industrial society to a postmaterialist society
(INGLEHART, 1977), a post-industrial society
(TOURAINE et al., 1980) or a second modernity (BECK,
1992). Although there is an abundance of economic, social
and technical indicators of this transition, one must admit
that social sciences have been announcing this change for
more than twenty years, and that, for more than twenty years,
it has been elusive. The new does not completely
disintegrate the old. It is not that the prophecy announced
by these theories has aborted – on the contrary,
environmental actions seem to be developing – but their
loss of radicalism would be the price to pay for their
widespread dissemination. Thus, the environmental issue
has certainly driven new social forms, but it has also partly
reproduced old forms, or has grafted itself onto existing
structures. Such is the role of the State.
The green revolution has not taken place. Or rather,
according to Bruno Latour (1999), what we took for a green
revolution was only the “infantile disorder” of what he calls
political ecology. The environmental issue does not produce
any abrupt change. On the contrary, it involves
hybridisation. And this is its primary characteristic. The
environment is an instrument of hybridisation that questions
old dichotomies: between nature and culture, between lo-
cal and national, between the particular and the general,
between vernacular knowledge and scientific knowledge.
This questioning tends to deprive science and politics of
their respective monopolies as representatives of nature and
of society16. Against this background, the central State
becomes a manager of socio-natural diversity, the
technocratic State gives a voice to local know-how, and
the State concedes a certain plurality to the general public
interest of which it no longer has quite a complete
monopoly. The State is no longer quite what it was, in its
role and it functioning, but the State endures. Thus, the
society is changing, but the categories of the XX° century
are not totally obsolete yet. Is this unique to France, a relic
of an old centralist tradition, or is it a general trend whose
basic pattern may be observed in other places?
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